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The United States has been a leader of
worldwide efforts to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons.  To this end, the interna-
tional community and many individual states
have agreed to a range of treaties, laws, and
agreements known collectively as the nuclear
nonproliferation regime, aimed at keeping
nations that do not have nuclear weapons from
acquiring them.
The nonproliferation regime has also
been concerned with preventing terrorists
from obtaining  nuclear weapons or the mate-
rials to craft them. The attacks on New York
and Washington of September 11, 2001,
added a new level of reality to the threat that
terrorists might acquire a nuclear weapon and
explode it in a populated area.
Other nonproliferation concerns include
a number of regional focal points.  North
Korea’s claim that it possesses nuclear weap-
ons and is pursuing more has led to a diplo-
matic crisis.  In the Middle East,  Iran’s nu-
clear weapons development remains a threat.
Libya’s voluntary revelation of its covert
nuclear weapons program reinforced the fear
that nations may develop weapons without
being discovered.  The continuing confronta-
tion between India and Pakistan is made more
dangerous by their possession of nuclear
explosives.  There is concern about Chinese
and Russian activities that may encourage
proliferation in the other regions.
Disposing of plutonium and highly en-
riched uranium from dismantled Russian
nuclear weapons, while preventing it from
falling into the hands of terrorists or other
proliferators, is another current focus of
nonproliferation activities.  In the longer term,
the major question is fulfilling the pledge in
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) by
the nuclear weapons states, including the
United States, to pursue complete nuclear
disarmament, in the face of skepticism about
the possibility, or even the wisdom, of achiev-
ing that goal.
The terrorist attacks of September 11
added the suddenly more realistic threat of an
even more unimaginable assault with a nu-
clear explosive.  While terrorists had not been
ignored in nonproliferation efforts, particu-
larly with regard to Russian nuclear materials,
the major focus before the attacks had been on
preventing nation-states from developing
weapons capabilities.  While that task, in the
case of Iran and North Korea, has become
sharply more critical, the terrorist threat has
gained equal urgency and uncertainty.
Numerous U.S. agencies have programs
related to nuclear nonproliferation, but the
major activities are carried out by the Depart-
ments of State, Defense, and Energy.  DOE’s
program is part of the National Nuclear Secu-
rity Administration, which is responsible for





On July 29, 2004, the U.S. ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament announced
U.S. support for negotiating a treaty to cut off production of fissile materials for use in
weapons. The cutoff treaty is “ripe for negotiations,” according to the declaration.  (See “U.S.
Nonproliferation Policy.”)
In his meeting with President Bush in February 2005, Russian President Vladimir Putin
affirmed that Russia would supply fuel to the Bushehr nuclear power plant it is building in
Iran and would receive back spent fuel.  The agreement on fuel supply was signed by Iran
and Russia on February 28.  With fuel supplied by Russia, Iran has no need for to develop
uranium enrichment capability, which the United States opposes because it could be used for
nuclear weapons.  (See “Iran’s Nuclear Program.”)
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy
One of the enduring nightmares of the post-Cold War world has been that terrorists
might obtain a nuclear weapon, or the materials to craft one.  For many, this nuclear
nightmare was tempered by disbelief that terrorist organizations would be capable of
exploding a nuclear device in a populated area, and merciless enough to carry out such an
assault.  The  attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon cast serious doubt on such
reassuring assumptions.
While attention may have been redirected to the terrorist threat, other concerns about
the proliferation of nuclear weapons have not been diminished.  The United States has long
been a leader of worldwide efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional
nations, as well as to nongovernmental entities.  Since the 1950s these nonproliferation
efforts have built up a broad international structure, including treaties, international
organizations with inspection mechanisms, and other agreements, complemented by wide-
ranging domestic legislation. 
The centerpiece of this structure is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).  Under
the terms of the NPT, the five declared nuclear weapons states — the United States, the
United Kingdom, Russia, France and China — agreed “not in any way to assist” any  non-
weapons state to acquire nuclear weapons. They also agreed to reduce and eventually
eliminate their own nuclear arsenals. Non-weapons states agreed not to develop nuclear
weapons and to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect their nuclear
facilities and materials to ensure that peaceful nuclear technology is not diverted to military
purposes. The NPT also guarantees non-weapons states access to peaceful nuclear
technology.  Since the end of the Cold War, participation in the NPT has been almost
universal.  Except for India and Pakistan, whose pursuit of nuclear weapons capabilities and




Beyond the NPT, the United States relies on various positive and negative incentives
to persuade countries that may be interested in nuclear weapons not to acquire them.  For
countries facing security threats, the United States has provided security guarantees in the
form of alliances that address the underlying motivation to acquire nuclear weapons.  Both
Japan and Germany, for example, had nuclear weapons programs during the Second World
War and might have continued to pursue nuclear weapons after the war if the United States
had not included them as allies.  After the Cold War, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
relinquished their nuclear capabilities to ensure good relations with the West. 
Another important nonproliferation tool is technology denial.  The United States and
other suppliers of nuclear technology try to prevent countries that are trying to develop
nuclear weapons from buying the equipment they need to produce nuclear weapons.  This
activity is particularly focused on Russia and former Soviet republics, where loose controls
on nuclear technology, materials, and expertise could result in their being purchased or stolen
by those seeking nuclear weapons.  The United States has obligated over $3 billion since the
end of the Cold War helping those countries improve security for nuclear assets, and current
programs among three federal agencies now total almost $1 billion per year.
Sanctions are another way the United States has tried to deter and  punish proliferators.
Sanctions can cut off U.S. aid, economic assistance, military cooperation, and technology
access to countries that violate nonproliferation agreements or take steps, such as testing
nuclear weapons, that threaten U.S. national security objectives.  However, sanctions are
sometimes controversial.  The executive branch sometimes prefers not to impose sanctions
to avoid damaging relations with other countries,  and Congress has sometimes relaxed
sanctions, such as those imposed on India and Pakistan after they tested nuclear weapons. 
Finally, the Department of Defense tries to deter acquisition and use of nuclear weapons
by maintaining a strong military force.  If nonproliferation and deterrence fail, the Defense
Department could be ordered to use military force to destroy weapons of mass destruction.
The military component of nonproliferation policy is often called counterproliferation.  
Nonproliferation efforts have been concerned with three major types of problems.  In
the short term they focus on a number of regional crisis points: the India-Pakistan arms race,
North Korea, and Iran.  There is concern also about Chinese and Russian activities that may
encourage proliferation in the other regions.  A second problem is the disposal of plutonium
and highly enriched uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons, while preventing
it from falling into the hands of terrorists or other proliferators.  In the longer term, the major
problem is fulfilling the pledge in the NPT by the nuclear weapons states, including the
United States, to pursue complete nuclear disarmament, in the face of skepticism about the
possibility, or even the wisdom, of achieving that goal.
To these concerns was added a suddenly more realistic threat that terrorists, having
achieved such shocking devastation in the destruction of the World Trade Towers in New
York, may be tempted to carry out an even more unimaginable assault with a nuclear
explosive.  Terrorists had not been ignored in nonproliferation efforts, particularly with
regard to Russian nuclear materials, but the major focus had been on preventing nation-states
from developing weapons capabilities.  While many features of the nonproliferation regime,
such as export controls and monitoring, are applicable to the terrorist threat, some shift in
focus has been necessary.
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International Nonproliferation Structures 
and Organizations
The International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
The nuclear nonproliferation regime to deter further spread of nuclear weapons consists
of treaties, international organizations, and multilateral and bilateral agreements, augmented
by various unilateral actions intended to prevent further proliferation. 
Major components of the regime include:
! The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in
1970.  It commits non-nuclear weapons members not to acquire nuclear
weapons, and to allow international inspection of all their nuclear activities
to verify this commitment.  It commits nuclear weapons states not to assist
non-weapons states to develop nuclear weapons, and to pursue the goal of
an end to the nuclear arms race and eventually to nuclear disarmament.
! The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an international
organization of the United Nations, established in Vienna, whose safeguards
system verifies NPT compliance. Non-weapons NPT parties negotiate
inspection agreements with the IAEA to verify the peaceful use of their
nuclear materials.
! Informal international groups, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG), a committee of nuclear supplier nations that maintains multilateral
guidelines for nuclear exports, and the Zangger Committee, an NPT affiliate
that maintains a “trigger list” of  nuclear items requiring safeguards.  The
NSG and Zangger guidelines were strengthened in 1992, after the Gulf War
and the crisis with Iraq’s nuclear weapons program.  The Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which restricts exports of
nuclear-capable missiles, is another component of the nonproliferation
structure. (For more details on these entities, see CRS Report RL31559,
Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status.)
! The Convention on Physical Security for Nuclear Materials (1987) sets
international security standards for storing, using, and transporting nuclear
materials.
The Nonproliferation Treaty and the IAEA 
The NPT provides the legal and institutional basis for international nonproliferation
policy.  Like all international agreements, it depends for its success on the good will of its
participants, and does not guarantee that countries will not violate their commitments.
However, to reinforce the good intentions of the signatories, the NPT set up an inspection
system called safeguards, based on agreements between non-weapons states and the IAEA
that permit routine inspections.  The IAEA has no enforcement power; it can only report
discrepancies to the U.N.  By presenting the prospect that clandestine proliferation activities
will be detected and exposed, the inspection system is designed to deter proliferation through
international pressure, disapproval, and possible sanctions and countermeasures.
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In order to prevent proliferation, IAEA inspections must be effective, and the prospect
of international disapproval strong enough to deter a non-weapons NPT member from
pursuing nuclear weapons development.  Since the Gulf War, efforts to strengthen IAEA
inspection powers have been underway, culminating in May 1997 with the adoption of an
“additional protocol” agreement intended to give inspectors more access to a wider array of
activities, information, and facilities.
IAEA Inspections.  In the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, U.N. inspectors
were surprised at the scope of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program and the progress Iraq had
made toward obtaining nuclear weapons despite regular IAEA inspections.  A major
weakness in the existing system was that inspectors only inspected sites and facilities listed
in the safeguards agreements with the agency.  The Strengthened Safeguards System adopted
at the May 1995 NPT extension and review conference gives inspectors strengthened ability
to detect clandestine nuclear activities.  Strengthened safeguards include taking
environmental samples, no-notice inspections of nuclear facilities, complete access to records
to confirm that all nuclear materials have been declared, and remote and unattended
monitoring.  A new modification to IAEA safeguards agreements with member states
requires an “expanded declaration” by all NPT members of nuclear-related activities such
as uranium mining. It also authorizes IAEA access to any place. In dealing with Iran’s
suspected nuclear weapons program, the IAEA has been pressing for Iran to accept the
enhanced inspections included in the Additional Protocol. (See Iran’s Nuclear Program.)
Enforcement. Even if IAEA inspectors detect clandestine nuclear weapons activity,
the NPT contains no formal provisions for forcing a country to abandon the activity.  Iraq’s
nuclear program was dismantled because U.N. forces militarily defeated Iraq after driving
it out of Kuwait in 1991.  In the absence of such military force a defiant NPT signatory could
presumably continue its activities if it were willing to resist nonmilitary international
pressures and disapproval.  North Korea, in the inspection crisis prior to the Agreed
Framework that was reached in 1994, violated its obligations and announced that it was
withdrawing from NPT.  The Security Council did not take decisive action to enforce the
NPT.  North Korea reversed its decision only after being promised two nuclear power
reactors and shipments of fuel oil. That agreement was abandoned following North Korea’s
resumption of its nuclear weapons program. (See Proliferation Crisis in North Korea, below.)
The efforts of the nonproliferation regime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons
have not been without critics.  Some view IAEA activities as ineffectual and toothless, easy
to evade by an entity determined to develop nuclear weapons capability.  Nor is the NPT
system without its critics among non-nuclear-weapons nations.
NPT “Discrimination”
Despite the successful recruitment of almost all nations into the NPT, and the agreement
in 1995 to make it permanent, a current of discontent exists about the difference in treatment
of the five declared nuclear weapons states — who get to keep their weapons — compared
with all the rest.
The Nuclear Bargain: Atoms for Peace. Part of the discontent derives from the
changed prospects of commercial nuclear power.  When the NPT was negotiated, peaceful
nuclear power was viewed as a technology with great economic potential for all countries,
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both industrialized and developing.  Joining the NPT was a quid pro quo under which non-
weapons states renounced nuclear weapons in return for obtaining access to the technology
and materials necessary to exploit commercial nuclear power — a concept that goes back to
President Eisenhower’s 1954 “Atoms for Peace” initiative.  However, the economic
advantage of nuclear power has declined significantly since then.  Nuclear power is
important in many countries, but is under strong competition from other energy sources.  The
high capital cost of nuclear powerplants, and the technical skills required to operate them
safely and economically, have been major barriers to use of nuclear energy by developing
countries, even where the main alternatives are coal and imported fossil fuels. This part of
the NPT bargain has thus not been very rewarding for many non-weapons states, although
they continue to receive assistance in the uses of nuclear technology in medicine, agriculture,
and scientific research.
The Nuclear Bargain: Disarmament.  Another part of the original NPT bargain
was a promise by all signatories, including the weapons states, to “pursue negotiations in
good faith” for the “cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control” (Article VI).  At the time the NPT was negotiated, the first goal, an
early end to the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, must have
seemed unlikely, nuclear disarmament unattainable in the foreseeable future, and “general
and complete disarmament” altogether utopian.
The nuclear powers did pursue negotiations over strategic arms limitations in the 1970s
and 1980s, and the abrupt end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union made
deep reductions in nuclear armaments possible.  However, some non-weapon NPT states
want more progress toward the goal of  nuclear disarmament.  How to proceed in this
direction has been the subject of considerable controversy.  (See “U.S. Nonproliferation
Policy,” below.)
Proliferation Motives
Peaceful nuclear power may have lost its glitter, and the prospect of complete nuclear
disarmament may be dim.  On the other hand,  the motives for pursuing nuclear weapons
remain unchanged. A few states facing urgent security threats might view nuclear weapons
as the best way to deter attack.  Noting that all five of the permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council are nuclear weapons states, some might view them as important
for prestige.  Still others might view them as effective battlefield weapons that can be used
to defeat enemies and conquer territory.
Despite these motivations, many countries have abandoned nuclear weapons and have
sought other ways to ensure their security.  Germany and Japan, both major powers, are non-
weapons states.  In 1991, South Africa, having made the transition to majority rule, revealed
and dismantled its clandestine program and renounced nuclear weapons.  Argentina and
Brazil, both of which had secret nuclear weapons programs under military governments,
abandoned them under civilian rule and joined the NPT.  Former Soviet republics Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan returned the Soviet weapons left on their territory and joined the




Interest in nuclear weapons, however, did not disappear.  India and Pakistan, having
tested nuclear devices, continue in confrontation over Kashmir.  Tension between Israel and
its Arab neighbors persists, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons technology remains a threat,
and Iraq’s nuclear potential was a chief target of U.S. action against the regime of Saddam
Hussein.  China and Russia remain proliferation concerns as potential sources of nuclear
technology.  North Korea is a serious and current proliferation threat.
U.S. Nonproliferation Policy
The United States has been and continues to be a leading proponent of the international
nonproliferation  regime.  At the domestic level is a system of export control and licensing
laws (and regulations) covering transfers of nuclear technology or materials, including
dual-use technology that can contribute to nuclear weapons development.  There are also
laws requiring sanctions for violations of nonproliferation commitments, and sanctions
against non-weapons states that obtain or test nuclear weapons.
In seeking to carry out the pledge in the NPT to negotiate nuclear disarmament,
however, U.S. policy has been subject to controversy.  The major vehicle for efforts in this
direction in the 1990s was a treaty banning nuclear tests.  The treaty would essentially
confirm the moratorium on nuclear testing that all the weapons states, including the United
States, were observing.  However, when the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was
finally negotiated and signed, and submitted to the Senate by President Clinton in September
1997, it was vigorously opposed (see CRS Issue Brief IB92099, Nuclear Weapons:
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). The Senate declined to ratify the CTBT on October 13,
1999, by a vote of 48-51.
Despite the uncertainty introduced by rejection of the CTBT, steps toward ending the
nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament have continued, as called for in Article VI of the
NPT.  In January 2002 the Bush Administration released the results of its “Nuclear Posture
Review,” announcing that nuclear planning would no longer address the “Russian threat,”
as left over from the Cold War, but would develop capabilities to meet a range of threats
from unspecified countries.  The redirection would be accompanied by a large, unilateral
reduction in deployed nuclear weapons.  However, the new policy also included development
of a controversial missile defense capability, and improving the nuclear weapons
“infrastructure” to allow resumption of testing and possible development of new weapons
more rapidly.  Although the Administration statement did not indicate that such activities
were contemplated or necessary, the suggestion that they might be in the future caused
dismay in some nonproliferation circles.  (For details, see CRS Report RS21133, The
Nuclear Posture Review: Overview and Emerging Issues.)
Another proposal leading toward nuclear disarmament has been a treaty to halt
production of fissile materials for use in weapons.  Such a treaty would only affect the five
nuclear weapons states and non-signers of the NPT — India, Pakistan, and Israel — since
non-weapons signatories of the NPT have already committed not to pursue nuclear weapons.
The so-called Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) has been a subject of discussion at the
Geneva Conference on Disarmament for some years, but little progress has been made.  On
July 29, 2004, the U.S. ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Jackie Sanders,
declared the FMCT “ripe for negotiations” and “reaffirmed” U.S. commitment to negotiate
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a legally binding treaty.  Ambassador Sanders said, however, that a U.S. policy review
concluded that “realistic, effective verification” of such a treaty was not “achievable.”
U.S. policy on nonproliferation also has been directed toward making the NPT more
effective.  Responding to Pakistani nuclear expert Abdul Qadeer Kahn’s revelation that he
had headed a network that spread nuclear weapons technology and equipment to Iran, North
Korea, and Libya, President Bush on February 11, 2004, urged more and stricter controls on
nuclear exports.  Among his recommendations was that non-nuclear weapons states
renounce developing capacity to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium as part of
commercial nuclear power programs, while nuclear supplier nations ensure adequate fuel for
nuclear plants at reasonable prices.  He also argued that IAEA’s Additional Protocol for
inspections regimes be required of all NPT signatories, and urged the Senate to consent to
it on the part of the United States.  On March 31 the Senate ratified the protocol (Treaty Doc.
107-7, Senate Executive Report 108-12).  As a nuclear weapons state, the United States in
agreeing to IAEA inspections has the right to exclude any activities or sites that it declares
are of “direct national security significance.”
Every five years NPT parties hold a Review Conference to discuss treaty
implementation.  The next Review Conference will be held in New York from May 2 to May
27, 2005.  Many of these issues, concerning both compliance with the requirements not to
acquire nuclear weapons on the part of non-weapons states and pursuing nuclear
disarmament by the weapons states, will be discussed at the May conference.  For an analysis
of the implications of these issues in the context of the conference, see CRS Report
RL32857, The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference: Issues for Congress,
by Sharon Squassoni and Carl E. Behrens.
On May 27, 2004, then-Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham, meeting with the IAEA
in Vienna, announced a Global Threat Reduction Initiative aimed at repatriating fresh and
spent fuel containing highly enriched uranium (HEU) from research reactors around the
world supplied by the United States and Russia, and converting reactors that use HEU fuel
to operate on low-enriched uranium.  These activities, which already exist in DOE, would
be consolidated in a single organization within the Department’s National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA).   Abraham said that the target for completion of the program was
2010, and that it would be funded at about $450 million.
Nuclear Cooperation and Export Controls
In order to engage in international trade in nuclear technology or materials (such as
nuclear fuel),  U.S. companies must obtain export licenses from the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC).  Before an export license can be applied for, there must be in force a
bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation between the U.S. government and the
government of the importing nation.  The conditions necessary for drawing up and approving
an agreement for cooperation, laid out in Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, include a
90-day review by Congress.  In several cases, congressional review of an agreement for
cooperation has been controversial; most recently, Congress allowed an agreement with
China to take effect in 1997, but only after extended debate.  Others have attracted less
attention.  A single agreement is in force between the United States and the members of the
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).
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In addition to NRC’s licensing and regulation role, the Department of Energy (DOE)
also participates in export controls.  DOE authorizes the transfer of nuclear technology to
countries having agreements for nuclear cooperation with the United States via “subsequent
arrangements,” the details of which are spelled out in Section 131 of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954.  In general, NRC deals largely with licensing hardware, while DOE licenses
information and knowledge, under regulations defined in 10 CFR Part 810.
Finally, the Department of Commerce also is involved in regulating exports of dual-use,
nuclear-related commodities under the provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1979.
That law expired and successive Congresses have not passed new legislation, although there
have been several attempts to do so. Commerce continues to play a role in export regulation,
however.
Nonproliferation Statutes 
 The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (P.L. 88-703, as amended) established rules for
nuclear commerce that have become the international norm. The Atomic Energy Act requires
that a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement be negotiated between the United States and
any foreign country before major nuclear technology can be exported to that country.  The
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242) strengthened those earlier rules and
established the requirement of full scope safeguards as a condition of supply.  This means
that any country, except the five NPT weapons states, that wants to import nuclear
technology from the United States must accept IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear facilities.
Similar requirements have been adopted by all major nuclear suppliers except China. 
Sanctions.  In order to deter or punish proliferators, Congress has passed many laws
imposing sanctions on countries that proliferate and those who assist them.  The Arms
Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act contain provisions that cut off U.S.
assistance to countries that illegally acquire nuclear weapons or the means to make them. 
Critics of sanctions argue that they mainly punish U.S. firms and are often undercut by
foreign countries that continue to trade with proliferators.  Supporters of sanctions argue that
they send a strong signal to proliferators and to other countries that proliferation has negative
consequences and will disrupt “business as usual.” (For more details, see CRS Report
RL31502, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation Sanctions: Selected
Current Law, by Dianne E. Rennack.) 
Federal Organization for Nonproliferation
The Departments of State, Energy, Defense, and Commerce, the intelligence
community, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are all involved in the
formulation and implementation of nonproliferation policy.
! The National Security Council is the hub of nonproliferation policy, with the
primary task of reconciling nonproliferation policy with foreign, trade, and
national security policies. 
! The State Department, in consultation with the Energy Department,
negotiates U.S. agreements for nuclear cooperation and represents U.S.
nonproliferation interests with other states and international organizations
such as the IAEA.  
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! The Department of Defense is responsible for counterproliferation strategy
and policy, and also administers programs to help Russia guard and control
its nuclear weapons complex. 
! The Department of Energy provides expertise in nuclear weapons to support
nonproliferation policy and diplomacy, largely through its national
laboratories. It issues permits for the export of nuclear information and
knowledge under so-called Part 810 (10 CFR Part 810) regulations. DOE
also administers some programs to control fissile materials in the former
Soviet Union. 
! The Nuclear Regulatory Commission licenses nuclear exports subject to
concurrence by the Department of State.
!  The Department of Commerce oversees licensing of dual-use exports as
mandated by Section 309(c) of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, which
requires controls on “all export items, other than those licensed by the NRC,
which could be, if used for purposes other than those for which the export
is intended, of significance for nuclear explosive purposes.” 
! The Central Intelligence Agency has a Nonproliferation Center that
coordinates intelligence aspects of nonproliferation policy. 
  Several interagency working groups coordinate the various responsibilities for
nonproliferation policy.  
Funding Nonproliferation Programs
As indicated above, the major nonproliferation activities are carried out by the
Departments of State, Defense and Energy.  The tables below represent current funding for
those three agencies.
Table 1. State Department Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, 
Demining, and Related (NADR) Programs
($ million)
 FY2005 FY2006Request
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 31.7 37.5
Export Control Assistance 37.7 44.4
Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise 50.1 52.6
IAEA Voluntary Contribution 52.6 50.0
International Monitoring System (CTBT) 18.8 14.4
Antiterrorism Assistance 117.8 133.5
Terrorist Interdiction Program 5.0 7.5
Counterterrorism Engagement 2.0 2.0
Counterterrorism Financing 7.2 7.5
Other 75.9 90.7
Total, NADR Program 398.8 440.1
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Not all the activities of the NADR program are concerned with nuclear nonproliferation.
Of those that are:
! The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund provides funding for quick
response to unanticipated or unusually difficult nonproliferation needs.
! The Export Control Assistance program helps countries in the former Soviet
Union, in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and other areas develop their
ability to control exports of materials involved in proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD);
! Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise, formerly the Science Centers program,
supports facilities to redirect activities of former Soviet Union experts in
WMD;
! The International Monitoring System,  for detecting nuclear explosions, was
originally set up as part of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) Preparatory Commission;
! The IAEA Voluntary Contribution supports activities, particularly nuclear
inspections, that are vulnerable to the agency’s chronic funding crisis;
! Anti-Terrorism Assistance is largely a training program in Europe, the
former Soviet Union, Near East Asia, and other areas.




Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination — Russia 58.5 78.9
Weapons Storage Security — Russia 48.7 74.1
Weapons Transportation Security — Russia 26.3 30.0
WMD Proliferation Prevention — Former Soviet Union 40.0 40.6
Other (Including Biological & Chemical Weapons programs) 235.7 223.6
Total, FSU Threat Reduction 409.2 415.5
As in the State Department, not all CTR activities are directed to nuclear
nonproliferation objectives.  The program Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation
Prevention — FSU, is aimed at enhancing the capability of non-Russian FSU countries to
combat illicit trafficking in WMD materials across borders.  For a detailed discussion of
CTR programs, see CRS Report RL31957, Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction
Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union, by Amy F. Woolf.
In DOE, nonproliferation activities are carried out by the National Nuclear Security
Administration under its Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs.  (See Table 3.)
Proliferation R&D activities are aimed at techniques to monitor nuclear explosions, remotely
detect the early stages of a nuclear weapons program, improve detection of foreign nuclear
materials, and develop expertise in the areas of chemical and biological weapons.
Nonproliferation and International Security programs, formerly called “Arms Control,” are
concerned with international safeguards, export controls, treaties and agreements.
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The MPC&A program is concerned with reducing the threat posed by unsecured
Russian weapons and weapons-usable material.  The Global Initiatives for Proliferation
Prevention, formerly called the Russian Transition Initiative, includes two programs dealing
with the problem of employing former Soviet nuclear weapons experts.  The Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program is a cooperative arrangement between DOE
laboratories and science and engineering institutes in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and
Belarus.  The Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) involves efforts to develop commercial
activities in 10 formerly secret cities in Russia where nuclear weapons activities were carried
out.  The program was renamed for FY2006 to reflect expansion of the work to include
retraining and redirection of scientists and technicians from outside the former Soviet Union.
The Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Implementation program, also
described below, finances the agreement with Russia to use HEU from dismantled Soviet
weapons for fuel for nuclear power reactors.
Table 3. DOE Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs
($ million)
Program FY2005 FY2006Request
Nonproliferation and Verification R&D 224.0 272.2
Nonproliferation and International Security 91.3 80.2
International Materials Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) 294.7 343.4
Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention 40.7 37.9
Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production 44.0 132.0
HEU Transparency Implementation 20.8 20.5
Fissile Materials Disposition 613.1 653.1
Global Threat Reduction Initiative 93.8 98.0
Total, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 1,422.1 1,637.2
The program to eliminate production of plutonium in Russia was transferred from the
Defense Department to DOE in FY2003.  Three plutonium-producing reactors at two sites
in Russia also produce power for civilian consumption, and U.S. efforts have been aimed at
redesigning the plants so that any plutonium produced could remain unseparated.  The
program has been redirected to replacing the plants with fossil-fueled generating capacity and
shutting down the reactors by 2006 and 2007.
The mission of the fissile material disposal program is to dispose of plutonium from
dismantled weapons both in the United States and in Russia.  Most of the funding is for
construction of conversion facilities for U.S. plutonium.
Nuclear Proliferation in Specific Regions
India and Pakistan
The undeclared nuclear arms competition between India, Pakistan, and China reached
a turning  point on May 11, 1998, when India announced an underground test of three nuclear
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explosive devices, and followed it two days later with claims of two more.  Declaring that
China, with whom India had a border war in 1962, was “encircling” India militarily, in part
by providing its bitter rival Pakistan with nuclear weapons capability and missile weaponry,
Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee defended the test as necessary to correct the
“deteriorating security environment, especially the nuclear environment, faced by India for
some years past.”  India has refused to sign the NPT, and has been a bitter critic of what it
calls discrimination between the five weapons states and non-weapons states.
Pakistan said after the Indian tests that it was being dragged into a nuclear arms race,
and two weeks later claimed to have set off five nuclear blasts of its own.  The United States
responded by imposing sanctions on both countries and engaging in intensive diplomacy over
the next several years.  (President Bush lifted all sanctions on both countries relating to the
nuclear tests, following the terrorist attacks of September 11.)  Neither India nor Pakistan has
resumed testing, but relations between them have been intermittently tense, fed by the
volatile armed confrontation in the border state of Kashmir. On June 20, 2004, the two
countries agreed to reaffirm their unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing.  (For details, see
CRS Issue Brief IB93097, India-U.S. Relations, and CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S.
Relations.)
A further concern has been that Pakistan has been the source of aid to other proliferating
countries, such as Iran and North Korea.  These suspicions were confirmed on February 4,
2004, when Pakistan’s chief nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, acknowledged that he had
been responsible prior to 2000 for sending nuclear weapons technology and equipment to
Iran, North Korea, and Libya.  Khan said the activity took place without the knowledge of
the Pakistani government.
The Middle East and Israel
The ongoing confrontation between Islamic Middle East countries and Israel has long
had a nuclear undercurrent.  Israel has not signed the NPT, and has made no official
acknowledgment of a weapons program.  It is widely considered to have developed nuclear
weapons capability, although it is not known to have conducted a nuclear explosion.  Israel’s
nuclear program stimulated calls for an “Islamic bomb.”  Among Israel’s neighbors, Iraq and
Iran have been the focus of nuclear activity.  Iraq, before its defeat in the Gulf War in 1991,
actively pursued nuclear weapons development, despite having signed the NPT.  Iran
declares it has no nuclear weapons program, but the United States claims that it does.
Iraq’s Nuclear Weapons Program.  Before the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq had an
extensive covert nuclear weapons program that was built under the guise of legitimate
nuclear research and development.  As a member of the NPT, Iraq had allowed inspections
of declared facilities by the IAEA, but successfully concealed the true nature of its nuclear
program.  After the war, U.N. Resolution 687 established a Special Commission and gave
it authority to locate and remove Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.  The U.N. Special
Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) conducted extensive investigations of Iraq’s nuclear
program that revealed a multi-billion dollar effort to build nuclear weapons. UNSCOM and
the IAEA then dismantled Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure.  However, UNSCOM’s inspectors
left Iraq in 1998 and IAEA’s limited inspection powers under the NPT agreement were
feared inadequate to detect a renewal of nuclear weapons activities, a major motive behind
the action that led to the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime.  
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Iran’s Nuclear Program.  For many years, top U.S. officials have warned repeatedly
that Iran has a program to acquire nuclear weapons. The focus of concern had been Russia’s
efforts to complete a nuclear power plant at Bushehr, which had been started by Germany
in the 1970s under the former Shah of Iran. The revolutionary government that overthrew the
Shah in 1979 abandoned the project, then unsuccessfully tried to get Germany to revive it.
Russia’s MINATOM agency contracted to finish the plant with one of its own reactor
designs.  Progress has been slow, but the Russian builders have announced plans to start the
reactor soon.
Iran is a member of the NPT and has allowed inspections of its nuclear program.
Nevertheless, many observers suspected that Iran, which possesses substantial reserves of
oil and natural gas, was using its civilian nuclear program as a pretense to establish the
technical basis for a nuclear weapons option.  
These suspicions were bolstered in December 2002 with the revelation that two
facilities under construction near the cities of Natanz and Arak could be for the purpose of
enriching uranium, and for producing heavy water, which is used primarily in reactors
designed to produce weapons plutonium.  The Bushehr reactor, like most commercial power
reactors, does not use heavy water.  In February 2003, prior to scheduled IAEA inspections
of the facilities, Iranian President Mohammed Khatami said Iran planned to mine and enrich
its own uranium, and would reprocess the spent fuel from the reactor.  This was contrary to
the previous understanding that it would be fueled by Russian uranium which would be
returned to Russia when removed from the reactor.  Reprocessing would put separated
plutonium, which could be used for weapons, under Iranian control. Khatami said the
complete nuclear fuel cycle would be used only for peaceful civilian power generation, and
invited the IAEA to inspect the facilities.  But the United States said the plan “only makes
sense if it’s in support of a nuclear weapons program.” 
In June 2003 IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei noted questions about the enrichment and
heavy water projects, and called on Iran to agree to more stringent safeguards measures to
reassure other nations that it was not pursuing a hidden weapons program.  In October, after
a meeting with Iranian government officials, ElBaradei said that they had promised that Iran
would agree to the additional protocol, and had also “temporarily suspended” enrichment
activities.
In a report issued in late November 2003, ElBaradei said Iran acknowledged that it had
been developing a uranium centrifuge enrichment program for 18 years.  “It is clear,” the
report said, “that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to
meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement” with IAEA.  A further report in June
2004 noted some cooperation from Iran in answering questions about its enrichment
activities but noted remaining issues.  The IAEA board voted a resolution deploring Iran’s
lack of complete cooperation and noting that it had not yet ratified the additional protocol.
(See IAEA Inspections, above.)
U.S. policy since the discovery of the enrichment and heavy water facilities has been
to argue that the IAEA, on the basis of its own findings, take the issue of Iran’s violations
to the UN Security Council.  Negotiations between Iran and three European countries,
Britain, France, and Germany, led to an agreement by Iran in November 2004 to “continue
and extend its suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities.”  The
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enrichment initiative received further weakening when Russian President Vladimir Putin
assured President Bush in their February 2005 meeting that Russia would supply fuel for
Bushehr and receive back the spent fuel.  In that case Iran would have no need to develop its
own enrichment capability and facilities.  On February 28 Iranian Vice President Gholamreza
Aghazadeh and Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency chief Alexander Rumyantsev signed
an agreement on the fuel supply deal.  
(For more details, see CRS Report RS21592, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent
Developments.)
Nuclear Program in Libya Revealed.  In December 2003 Libyan leader Moammar
Gadhafi announced that Libya was abandoning its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and invited
IAEA director ElBaradi to inspect four previously clandestine sites in Tripoli.  The facilities
reportedly contained equipment to produce highly enriched uranium. (For details, see CRS
Issue Brief IB93109, Libya, by Clyde Mark.)  Press reports have suggested that both Iran and
Libya have obtained nuclear technology from Pakistan, and they were confirmed February
4, 2004, when Pakistan’s chief nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, acknowledged aiding
those two countries and North Korea as well.
China
China has long been a proliferation concern.  Until 1992 it refused to join the NPT, even
as one of the privileged five nuclear weapons states.  It was widely viewed as the major
supplier of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program in the 1980s and early 1990s, and also as
a supplier of aid and technology to Iran, although Chinese officials continue to deny helping
either country’s weapons program.  India, in justifying its own nuclear weapons tests,  cited
China’s help to Pakistan as a major motive in developing nuclear weapons capability.
China gradually took steps to join the international nonproliferation community, and by
1998 President Clinton and the Congress agreed to validate an agreement for nuclear
cooperation signed a decade earlier.  Concern about China’s full support of nonproliferation
aims continued, but in a move that drew praise from some nonproliferation circles, China in
December 2003 issued a White Paper on Nonproliferation emphasizing the importance of
international cooperation on export controls.  This was followed in January 2004 by an
agreement between the United States and China that established training programs and
information exchanges to help strengthen export controls, international nuclear safeguards,
and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities.
Proliferation Crisis in North Korea
North Korea joined the NPT in 1985, but delayed inspections until 1992.  In February
1993, North Korea denied access by IAEA inspectors to two sites that IAEA (and U.S.
intelligence) believed held evidence of clandestine nuclear work.  In March 1993, North
Korea notified the United Nations Security Council that it was withdrawing from the NPT,
which permits withdrawal after three months notice.  It subsequently suspended its
withdrawal, but claimed to have “unique status” under the NPT, and continued to block
inspections.  Former CIA Director James Woolsey and Secretary of Defense William Perry
warned that North Korea probably had enough plutonium for two bombs and that the fuel
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unloaded from its 25 megawatt (thermal) reactor could contain enough plutonium for several
more bombs.
In October 1994, the United States signed an agreement with North Korea under which
North Korea would shut down, but not dismantle, its existing reactor and reprocessing plant
(needed to extract plutonium from irradiated nuclear fuel), and halt construction on other
weapons-potential facilities, in return for provision of light water reactors less suited for
producing plutonium for bombs.  North Korea also received shipments of heavy oil to
compensate for energy that theoretically might have been generated from the reactors it
agreed to shut down.  The deal required North Korea to eventually resolve outstanding
safeguards violations, including its undeclared plutonium, before completion of the new
reactors.  An international consortium called the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO) was established in March 1995 to coordinate the reactor construction
project. 
On October 16, 2002, the U.S. State Department announced that North Korean officials
acknowledged continued nuclear weapons activity, in violation of the agreement.  In contrast
to its earlier efforts, which consisted of obtaining plutonium reprocessed from spent nuclear
reactor fuel, the current activity involved “a program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons”
which the State Department announcement said North Korea “had been embarked on ... for
several years.”  Enriching uranium to the level required for nuclear explosives requires
construction of a major facility with technologically sophisticated components.
In response the United States suspended further monthly shipments of oil to North
Korea, and the other members of KEDO — South Korea, Japan, and the European Union —
followed suit.  North Korea announced that it was restarting the small plutonium-production
reactor it had shut down as part of the Agreed Framework.  In April 2003 at a trilateral
meeting with China and the United States, North Korea claimed it had nuclear weapons and
was reprocessing spent fuel that had been stored under IAEA surveillance before the agency
was expelled.  In early August 2003 North Korea agreed to multilateral talks including
China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and the United States, but the first meeting late in that
month produced few results.  In October 2003, President Bush offered a written guarantee
of security that would probably be signed by the other nations involved in the talks, in return
for North Korea giving up its nuclear weapons program and surrendering its weapons and
stockpiles.  North Korea considered the proposal, but later rejected it. Talks have continued
intermittently, with little progress so far.  
The Bush Administration has consistently refused North Korea’s demand for bilateral
negotiations regarding its weapons program, insisting that the matter be dealt with in the
context of the six-nation multilateral talks.
(For details on the North Korean nuclear situation, see  CRS Issue Brief IB91141, North
Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program, by Larry Niksch.)
Russian Nuclear Weapons and Weapons Material
Russia and the United States do not have in force an agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation.  However, U.S. aid is being extended to Russia to help maintain safety and
safeguards of the vast nuclear arsenal inherited from the former Soviet Union.  (For details
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on Russia’s nuclear weapons complex, see CRS Report RL31957, Nonproliferation and
Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union, by Amy F. Woolf.)
Disposal of Russian nuclear materials from dismantled weapons is also a
nonproliferation issue.  In February 1993 the United States and Russia agreed that highly
enriched uranium from weapons would be diluted to a low enrichment level suitable for use
in commercial nuclear power reactors, and that the U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC)
would buy the uranium to supply to its customers.
Disposal of plutonium from weapons is more of a problem, since the use of plutonium
in power reactors is not widespread.  Eventually the large stocks of both U.S. and Russian
weapons plutonium will have to be dealt with.  The Clinton Administration proposed, as a
means of disposing of U.S. surplus weapons plutonium,  a “dual track” strategy of mixing
plutonium with uranium as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for commercial power reactors, and
vitrification (dissolving in glass) and disposal of the plutonium unsuited for fuel and the
resulting fission products.  In July 1998 the Department of Energy issued a draft
Environmental Impact Statement on the program. An agreement with Russia signed in
September 2000 set up a similar program for Russian plutonium disposal.
However, in submitting its FY2003 budget request, DOE declared that it was
eliminating the immobilization part of the two-track program for U.S. plutonium and instead
would add an “enhanced purification” stage to the MOX fuel fabrication facility so that most
of the plutonium originally destined for immobilization would instead be consumed as MOX
fuel.  The original plan called for 27.6 metric tons (MT) of plutonium to be converted to
MOX and 8.4 MT of impure plutonium to be immobilized.  The revision would purify 6.4
MT and convert it to MOX, and send the remaining 2.0 MT of highly impure plutonium
directly to a waste disposal site.
The plan to use weapons plutonium as fuel for nuclear power reactors raised opposition
from some nonproliferation interest groups, who argued that immobilization and disposal is
safer and less expensive than the MOX fuel option.  The Russian MOX option is particularly
troubled, because Russia does not have enough power reactors in which MOX can be used
to dispose of significant amounts of plutonium, and has been asking for help to build new
ones or to use the MOX in reactors in Germany or other countries, as well as aid in
constructing a MOX fuel conversion facility.  Further, Russia has declared that its ultimate
goal is to recycle plutonium from commercial power reactors, raising concerns that aiding
the disposal of weapons plutonium would encourage Russia to develop a “plutonium
economy” in its power industry.
There is less concern about the security of U.S. weapons plutonium.  As part of the U.S.
program, construction of a plant to convert plutonium into MOX fuel was planned for DOE’s
Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina.  The first part of this program was achieved
in August 2003, when DOE announced that all of the weapons-grade plutonium formerly at
the former plutonium processing facility at Rocky Flats in Colorado  had been shipped to
SRS.
